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Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Key to
Corporate Integrity Or Death Blow to Any
Corporation Guilty of Misconduct?
Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress
created the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter
"the Sentencing Commission") as an independent agency within
the judicial branch of the United States government.' The princi-
pal purpose of the Sentencing Commission is to "establish sentenc-
ing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system
that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guide-
lines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted
of federal crimes. ' On May 1, 1991, the Sentencing Commission
submitted to Congress the final draft of its guidelines3 for the sen-
1. 28 USC § 991 (1984). The Sentencing Commission was established under the au-
thority of 28 USC § 991:
(a) There is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the
United States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall consist of seven
voting members and one non-voting member. The President, after consultation...
[with various legal representatives] ... shall appoint the voting members of the
Commission, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, one of whom shall be
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as the Chairman...
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to (1) establish
sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that- (A)
assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of
title 18, United States Code; (B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the pur-
poses of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted'sentencing disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentencing when warranted
by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices; and (C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement
in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and (2)
develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing penal, and correc-
tional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 28 USC § 991 (1984).
2. 18 USCA App 4, Ch 1, Part A, 1 (Supp 1991).
3. The guidelines are set forth at 56 Fed Reg 22786. The guidelines will be incorpo-
rated as Chapter 8 of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 18 USCA App 4, Ch
1, Part A, 1 (Supp 1991). United States Sentencing Commission, Amendment to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed Reg 22761, 22787 (1991). Within this
article, the sentencing guidelines will be cited as "USSG §."
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tencing of organizations.4 These new guidelines became effective on
November 1, 1991. 5 The guidelines are the result of three years of
intense debate and the fourth draft of the guidelines presented by
the Sentencing Commission.
The United States Sentencing Commission has based the new
guidelines on four premises: (1) organizations must remedy the
harm caused by the wrongful act; (2) if the organization operates
primarily for a criminal purpose, the organization must be divested
of its assets; (3) the fine or penalty must be based upon the seri-
ousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization, and;
(4) probation may be imposed upon an organization where
necessary.'
4. Sentencing of Organization 56 Fed Reg at 22786 (cited in note 3). According to
the guidelines, an "organization" is defined as "a person other than an individual." 18 USC §
18 (1986, as amended). The term includes corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-
stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments
and political subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations. USSG Comment to § 8Al.1.
5. Duties of the Commission 28 USC § 994 (1984). According to the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, proposed guidelines submitted by the Sentencing Commission
become effective automatically six months after their date of submission unless Congress
passes an act amending the proposal:
The Commission, at or after the beginning of a regular session of Congress, but not
later than the first day of May, may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section
and submit to Congress amendments to the guidelines and modifications to previ-
ously submitted amendments that have not taken effect, including modifications to
the effective dates of such amendments. Such an amendment or modification shall be
accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor and shall take effect on a date
specified by the Commission, which shall be no earlier than 180 days after being so
submitted and no later than the first day of November of the calendar year in which
the amendment or modification is submitted, except to the extent that the effective
date is revised or the amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of
Congress.
Id.
6. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Can Corporations Learn to Live with the New Sentencing
Guidelines? Legal Backgrounder 1 (Wash Legal Found, June 7, 1991).
7. USSG Introductory Comment. The United States Sentencing Commission has
specifically set forth these principles in the Introductory Comment to the guidelines:
First, the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any
harm caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy the harm should not
be viewed as punishment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for the
harm caused. Second, if the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or
primarily by criminal means, the fine should be sufficiently high to divest the organi-
zation of all its assets. Third, the fine range for any other organization should be
based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization. The
seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the highest of the pecuniary
gain, the pecuniary loss, or the amount in a guideline offense level fine table. Culpa-
bility generally will be determined by the steps taken by the organization prior to the
offense to prevent and detect criminal conduct, the level and extent of involvement in
or tolerance of the offense by certain personnel and the organization's actions after an
Comments
The new guidelines will have serious effects upon corporations
conducting business in the United States and counsel representing
those corporations. In the event of a conviction for a corporate
crime, the mandatory sentencing guidelines will be used to set the
fine or penalty.8
The idea of bringing criminal charges against a corporation for
its wrongful acts is not new.9 More than likely, corporations have
been charged with criminal activity for as long as corporations
themselves have existed. In the past, however, the punishment
which has been imposed for a wrongful act has been minimal com-
pared to the potential penalties which can be imposed under the
new sentencing guidelines. 10 For example, as recently as 1989, less
than twenty percent of all convicted corporations paid any restitu-
tion whatsoever, and the average amount of restitution paid was
less than $50,000.11 Similarly, in 1989, fifty percent of all fines were
for less than $30,000, and the average fine was only $175,000.12
Under the new sentencing guidelines, a corporation can now be or-
dered to pay restitution for the entire cost of the harm caused by
the act and potential fines can run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars.13
As evidenced by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, mishaps in
today's corporate world can have far-reaching consequences.
Therefore, a workable system is needed to correct the damage cre-
ated by corporate misconduct. The sentencing guidelines are a new
weapon at the disposal of federal law enforcement officials to keep
corporate conduct in check.
offense has been committed. Fourth, probation is an appropriate sentence for an or-
ganizational defendant when needed to ensure that another sanction will be fully im-
plemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the organization to reduce the
likelihood of future criminal conduct.
Id.
8. USSG § 8A1.2.
9. See, for example, United States v Armour & Co., 168 F2d 342 (3d Cir 1948);
United States v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F2d 174 (3d Cir 1970);
United States v Hilton Hotels, 467 F2d 1000 (9th Cir 1973).
10. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 2 (cited in note 6).
11. Id.
12. Id. Although the new sentencing guidelines do not apply to environmental crimes,
it is interesting to note the recent trend of the law in this area. In light of the Exxon Valdez
oil spill in 1989 and several other environmental disasters, judges and prosecutors have been
much more adamant in sentencing corporations guilty of environmental misbehavior. The
Sentencing Commission is planning to review the applicability of the guidelines to environ-
mental crimes in the near future. It should not be surprising if the sentencing guidelines are
expanded into this realm by May 1, 1992. Id at 3.
13. USSG §§ 8B1.l and 8C2.1 et seq.
1992
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Although the sentencing guidelines will dramatically affect the
way a corporation conducts business, it is possible for a corpora-
tion to live harmoniously with the guidelines. However, because
the guidelines present an entirely new approach to the sentencing
of organizations, questions inevitably remain concerning how the
guidelines will be applied in any given situation. This comment be-
gins with a summary of the penalties which may be imposed under
the sentencing guidelines. It continues with a discussion of the in-
centives available for those corporations which comply with the
guidelines. Finally, this comment concludes by analyzing the desir-
ability and potential inadequacies of the guidelines.
PENALTIES IMPOSED UNDER THE GUIDELINES
Under the new guidelines, a corporation convicted of criminal
conduct may be penalized in one of four ways: restitution; fines;
probation; or special assessments, forfeitures and costs."4 The resti-
tution provisions of the guidelines require that a corporation take
all appropriate steps to provide compensation to identifiable vic-
tims of the crime. 15 The court may order restitution as part of the
sentence under 18 USC §§ 3663-3664 or as a condition of proba-
tion.'6 The purpose of such an order is to remedy the harm that
has already occurred and to prevent any future harm from occur-
ring.' 7 Additionally, community service may be ordered if the ser-
vices will provide restitution.18
The restitution provisions of the new guidelines will be of great-
est interest to the victims of the offense. The purpose of paying
14. See USSG §§ 8B1.1, 8C1.1, 8D1.1, SE1l..
15. USSG Introductory Comment to Part B. Identifiable victims of the crime can be
compensated through a restitution order or an order of probation requiring restitution. Id.
In the past, less than twenty percent of all convicted corporations paid any restitution, and
the average amount of restitution was less than $50,000. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 2
(cited in note 6).
16. USSG §§ 8B1.1 and 8B1.2. The court will enter an order of restitution:
(1) [I]f such order is authorized under 18 USC §§ 3663-3664; or (2) if a restitution
order would be authorized under 18 USC §§ 3663-3664, except for the fact that the
offense of conviction is not an offense set forth in title 18, United States Code, or 49
USC 1472 (h),(i),(j), or (n), sentence the organization to probation with a condition
requiring restitution.
USSG § 8B1.1.
17. USSG Commentary to § 8B1.2. The court may use its discretion in the creation of
a remedial order: "If the magnitude of expected future harm can be reasonably estimated,
the court may require the organization to create a trust fund sufficient to address that ex-
pected harm." USSG § 8B1.2.
18. USSG § 8B1.3.
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restitution is to compensate the victim for the harm suffered. 9
Through the restitution provisions, courts have at their disposal
remedies similar to those available under tort law. Since restitution
is ordered as part of a federal criminal prosecution, individual
plaintiffs who would otherwise lack the resources to bring such a
tort claim may now be made whole.20
A corporation will most likely experience its greatest potential
loss through the imposition of a fine.21 The sentencing guidelines
require the court to apply a complicated formula in setting the cor-
porate fine.22 The sentencing court must use two factors in setting
the fine: a base fine and a multiplier.2 3 Together, these two factors
produce a "guideline fine range" from within which the court has
discretion to select the precise fine to be imposed.24
The sentencing court must first determine the base fine.25 This is
a measure of the seriousness of the offense.26 The court selects the
greater of: (1) an amount from the table which corresponds to the
applicable "offense level" for the crime;27 (2) the corporation's pe-
cuniary gain from the offense; or (3) the pecuniary loss from the
offense caused by the corporation, "to the extent the loss was
caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
28
Once the base fine has been determined, the court must then
19. USSG Introductory Comment to Part B.
20. The restitution provisions most strongly reflect the first principle behind the
guidelines: "The court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy the
harm caused by the offense." USSG Introductory Comment. For the other principles behind
the guidelines, see note 7 and accompanying text.
21. USSG § 8C1.1 et seq. Without an effective corporate compliance program, corpo-
rations can expect to pay fines reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars for any
offense which results in a serious loss. Id. The sentencing guidelines require fines "as high or
higher than the highest fines" ever imposed by judges. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 2
(cited in note 6). By contrast, in 1989, fifty percent of fines were for less than $30,000 and
the average fine was for only $175,000. Id.
22. USSG § 8C1.1 et seq.
23. USSG at §§ 8C2.4, 8C2.6.
24. USSG § 8C2.7.
25. USSG § 8C2.4.
26. USSG Commentary to § 8C2.4.
27. USSG § 8C2.4. The offense levels set forth in the sentencing guidelines provide
for fines which range from a low of $5,000 for crimes with an offense level of six or less, to a
high of $72,000,000 for any crime with an offense level of thirty-eight or more. Id. In deter-
mining the offense level of a corporation, the guidelines apply the applicable offense level as
determined for certain individual crimes. USSG § 8C2.1. Offense levels generally correspond
to the seriousness of the crime. See 18 USC Appendix, Ch 2.
28. USSG § 8C2.4. As a general rule, the amount of the sanction (restitution and
fine) may not be less than the corporation's "profit" from the offense. Guiffra, Legal Back-
grounder at 3 (cited in note 6).
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apply a multiplier which is used to adjust the base fine depending
upon the corporation's culpability score.2 9 The culpability score is
a measure of the corporation's culpability in committing and re-
sponding to the offense. 0 The court in essence will look at any
aggravating or mitigating factors present in the case. Examples of
aggravating factors are: (1) the participation in, condoning of, or
tolerance of an offense by "high level personnel" or "substantial
authority personnel" of the corporation or business unit in ques-
tion; (2) a prior history of similar misconduct over the past ten
years by such corporation; (3) a violation of a prior judicial or ad-
ministrative order by the corporation; and (4) obstruction of jus-
tice by the corporation. 1 Mitigation credit will be given for: (1) the
maintenance of an effective compliance program to prevent and
detect violations of the law; (2) the self-reporting of the offense to
the authorities prior to "an imminent threat of detection"; (3) full
cooperation by the corporation in the investigation of the offense;
and (4) the corporation accepting responsibility for its criminal
conduct.32
The difference in treatment between a convicted corporation
having a high culpability score, and that having a low score is
great. A defendant receiving the lowest possible culpability score
could have its fine reduced by ninety-five percent.3 3 At the other
end of the spectrum, a corporation receiving the highest possible
culpability score could have its fine quadrupled.
3 4
A court may depart from the guidelines if the organization can-
not and is not likely to be able to pay the required restitution and
fine, or if the owners of a closely-held corporation have already
been fined for the same offense.3 5 A departure from the guide-
lines36 is also permitted if the corporation offered substantial assis-
29. USSG §§ 8C2.5, 8C2.6. The multiplier to be applied ranges from a minimum of
0.05 to a maximum of 4.0. The multiplier to be applied is determined by the corporation's
culpability score. In determining the corporation's culpability score, the court begins with a
culpability score of five points and points are either added or subtracted according to the
presence or absence of the factors listed in the accompanying text. Id at § 8C2.5.
30. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 3 (cited in note 6).
31. USSG § 8C2.5
32. Id.
33. USSG § 8C2.6.
34. Id.
35. USSG §§ 8C3.3, 8C3.4.
36. A departure from the guidelines may lead to a greater or lesser penalty depending
upon the reason for departure. USSG Introductory Commentary preceeding § 8C4.1. The
Commentary states: "Departures may be warranted if the court finds 'that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
Vol. 30:331336
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tance to authorities or if the offense involved a threat to national
security, the environment or a securities market, or if the offense
involved bribery of a public official or the threat of death or bodily
injury.3
The sentencing guidelines also provide for placing a corporation
on probation. 8 The guidelines set forth a number of conditions
under which the sentencing court is required to do so.s As a gen-
eral statement, it is almost certain that a corporation will be
placed on probation, as a condition of its sentence, if it does not
have an "effective" compliance program in effect.40
The guidelines permit courts to impose any probationary condi-
tions that "are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances
of the offense or the history and characteristics of the organiza-
tion,"'41 so long as those conditions "involve only such deprivations
consideration by the Sentencing Commission.'" Id.
37. USSG at § 8C4.1 et seq. The Washington Legal Foundation indicates that the
new sentencing guidelines will apply to about eighty percent of all federal offenses commit-
ted by a corporation. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 3 (cited in note 6). However, the new
sentencing guidelines will not apply to environmental crimes, export control or food and
drug crimes. Id. Additionally, the guidelines do not address civil rights violations. USSG §
8C2.1.
38. USSG Part D.
39. USSG § 8D1.1. The court is required to place a corporation on probation:
(1) If such sentence is necessary to secure payment of restitution (Q 8B1.1), enforce
a remedial order (Q 8D1.2), or ensure completion of community service (Q 8B1.3);
(2) If the organization is sentenced to pay a monetary penalty (e.g., restitution,
fine, or special assessment); the penalty is not paid in full at the time of sentencing,
and restrictions are necessary to safeguard the organization's ability to make
payments;
(3) If, at the time of sentencing, an organization having 50 or more employees does
not have an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law;
(4) If the organization within five years prior to sentencing engaged in similar mis-
conduct, as determined by a prior criminal adjudication, and any part of the miscon-
duct underlying the instant offense occurred after that adjudication;
(5) If an individual within high-level personnel of the organization or the unit of
the organization within which the instant offense was committed participated in the
misconduct underlying the instant offense and that individual within five years prior
to sentencing engaged in similar misconduct, as determined by a prior criminal adju-
dication, and any part of the misconduct underlying the instant offense occurred after
that adjudication;
(6) If such sentence is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organi-
zation to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct;
(7) If the sentence imposed upon the organization does not include a fine; or
(8) If necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes of sentencing set forth
in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2).
USSG § 8D.1.
40. USSG § 8D1.1(3).
41. USSG § 8D1.3.
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of liberty or property as are necessary to effect the purposes of the
sentencing."42
The Sentencing Commission has set forth in policy statements
the possible conditions of probation, including (1) a requirement
that the corporation take out newspaper and television advertise-
ments publicizing the offense and any steps it plans to take to pre-
vent a recurrence; (2) a requirement that the corporation develop
and submit a compliance program to the court for its approval; (3)
permitting a court-appointed probation officer to monitor the cor-
poration's administration of the compliance program; or (4) a re-
quirement that, if probation has been imposed to collect restitu-
tion or a fine, the court be notified of "any material adverse change
in its business.
43
Finally, the sentencing guidelines also provide that a convicted
corporation may be required to pay special assessments, forfeitures
and costs. 44 For example, a corporation may be required to pay the
costs of its own prosecution.45 Similarly, for example, if the corpo-
ration was convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute, the corporation would be required to forfeit
the proceeds of any racketeering activity.46
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Although the new guidelines will have far reaching affects, it is
possible for a corporation to live harmoniously with the guidelines.
Like the proverbial donkey led about his daily task contantly chas-
ing a carrot dangling in front of him, the Sentencing Commission
has enticed corporations to become law-abiding citizens through
the use of incentives.47 As stated above, a corporation which has
42. Id. The guidelines also state that as a term of probation, the corporation shall not
commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of probation. USSG §
8D1.3(a). Additionally, if the crime committed is a felony, the court shall impose one of the
following: "A fine, restitution, or community service, unless the court finds on the record
that extraordinary circumstances exist that would make such condition plainly unreasona-
ble, in which event, the court shall impose one or more other conditions set forth in 18 USC
3563(b)." USSG § 8D1.3(b).
43. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 4 (cited in note 6).
44. USSG § 8E1.1
45. Id.
46. USSG § 8E1.2. It should be noted that if the corporation was originally organized
for the purpose of conducting an illegal activity, the corporation may be divested of all its
assets. USSG Introductory Comment.
47. Guiffra, Legal Backgrounder at 4 (cited in note 6). The Introductory Comment to
the new guidelines states:
This chapter is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their
Vol. 30:331338
1992 Comments 339
taken steps to detect and prevent criminal activity may have its
fine reduced by as much as ninety-five percent.4 A corporation
which has taken all steps to detect and prevent criminal conduct
may also avoid prosecution entirely.4 9
Because of the great variation in fines which may result through
the application of the multiplier,50 the clear objective for corporate
counsel will be to assure that, should the corporation become the
subject of a criminal investigation, the corporation is positioned to
achieve the lowest possible culpability score.
A number of factors will affect the culpability score.51 Under the
sentencing guidelines, culpability scoring is structured in a way
such that the factors are interrelated. For instance, in a large cor-
poration with over five thousand employees, five points will be
added to the culpability score if high-level personnel were involved
in the offense.2 Similarly, three points will be subtracted if the
firm had an effective compliance program in place.53 However, a
rebuttable presumption exists that a compliance program is not ef-
fective if high-level personnel were involved in the offense. Thus,
in a given situation, the presence of a properly functioning compli-
ance program may lead to a culpability difference of eight points.
54
agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incen-
tives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and
reporting criminal conduct.
USSG Introductory Comment.
48. See note 33 and accompanying text.
49. See note 74 and accompanying text.
50. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
51. When calculating the culpability score, a corporation starts with five points.
USSG § 8C2.5. If high-level personnel or substantial authority personnel are involved in the
offense, i.e., they participated in, condoned, or were willfully ignorant of the offense, one to
five points may be added. Id. The number of points to be added depends upon the number
of employees in the corporation. Id. If the firm has a prior history of similar misconduct,
two points are added. Id. If the offense involved a violation of a judicial order or condition
of probation, two or one points are added respectively. Id. Finally, if the corporation will-
fully obstructed the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the offense, three points are
added. Id.
A valid corporate compliance program earns the corporation three mitigation points, self-
reporting of the crime results in the subtraction of five points, co-operation with the investi-
gation earns two points and acceptance of responsibility for the offense, one point. Id.
52. Id. High-level personnel will be involved in the offense if the individual was "will-
fully ignorant of the activity." Id.
53. Id.
54. A corporation starts with five points. Id. If a compliance program is not in place
or it is deemed to be ineffective, three points will not be subtracted. Id. If high-level person-
nel were involved in the offense, five points are added. Id. Such a change in culpability
scoring assumes that a properly functioning compliance program detects and prevents the
activities of the high-level personnel.
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When converted into the multiplier table, this could amount to a
change in the potential fine of hundreds of millions of dollars.
55
Therefore, it should be obvious that the key to avoiding an ex-
tremely large fine under the new sentencing guidelines is to have in
place an effective program to detect and prevent criminal con-
duct.56 The guidelines state that the hallmark of an effective com-
pliance program is that the organization exercise due diligence in
seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct.57 Due diligence re-
quires that the organization at a minimum take the following steps
to prevent and detect criminal activity:
(1) The organization must have established compliance standards and pro-
cedures to be followed by its employees and other agents that are reasona-
bly capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct;
(2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the organization
must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee compliance with
such standards and procedures;
(3) The organization must have used due care not to delegate substantial
discretionary authority to individuals whom the organization knew, or
should have known through the exercise of due diligence, had a propensity
to engage in illegal activities;
(4) The organization must have taken steps to communicate effectively its
standards and procedures to all employees and other agents, e.g., by requir-
ing participation in training programs or by disseminating publications that
explain in a practical manner what is required;
(5) The organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve compli-
ance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring and auditing systems
reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its employees and other
agents and by having in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby
employees and other agents could report criminal conduct by others within
the organization without fear of retribution;
(6) The standards must have been consistently enforced through appropri-
ate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate, discipline of individ-
uals responsible for the failure to detect an offense. Adequate discipline of
individuals responsible for an offense is a necessary component of enforce-
ment: however, the form of discipline that will be appropriate will be case
specific;
(7) After an offense has been detected, the organization must have taken all
reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense and to prevent fur-
ther similar offenses-Including any necessary modifications to its program
55. USSG §§ 8C2.4, 8C2.6.
56. USSG § 8A1.2 The guidelines define "an effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law" as a program that has been reasonably designed, implemented, and en-
forced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.
Failure to prevent or detect the instant offense, by itself, does not mean that the program
'was not effective. Id.
57. USSG Comment 3(k) to § 8A1.2.
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to prevent and detect violations of law.
58
Unfortunately, the guidelines themselves do not present much
additional help in determining precisely what factors a corporate
compliance program must contain. 59 One interest group has sug-
gested that a compliance program is an effort to ensure, to the
maximum extent possible, that an organization and its employees
will meet the requirements of law.60 It has also been suggested that
such a program, once implemented, serves to raise the conscious-
ness of employees as to ethical issues and assists employees in
resolving problems in a responsible manner.6 '
The Washington Legal Foundation 2 has suggested ten steps
which should be considered when developing a compliance pro-
58. Id.
59. The guidelines do state:
The precise actions necessary for an effective program to prevent and detect viola-
tions of law will depend upon a number of factors. Among the relevant factors are: (i)
Size of the organization-The requisite degree of formality of a program to prevent
and detect violations of law will vary with the size of the organization: The larger the
organization, the more formal the program typically should be. A larger organization
generally should have established written policies defining the standards and proce-
dures to be followed by its employees and other agents. (ii) Likelihood that certain
offenses may occur because of the nature of its business-If because of the nature of
an organization's business there is substantial risk that certain types of offenses may
occur, management must have taken steps to prevent and detect those types of of-
fenses. For example, if an organization handles toxic substances, it must have estab-
lished standards and procedures designed to ensure that those substances are prop-
erly handled at all times. If an organization employs sales personnel who have
flexibility in setting prices, it must have established standards and procedures
designed to prevent and detect price-fixing. If an organization employs sales person-
nel who have flexibility to represent the material characteristics of a product, it must
have established standards and procedures designed to prevent fraud. (iii) Prior his-
tory of the organization-An organization's prior history may indicate types of of-
fenses that it should have taken actions to prevent. Recurrence of misconduct similar
to that which an organization has previously committed casts doubt on whether it
took all steps to prevent such misconduct. An organization's failure to incorporate
and follow applicable industry practice or the standards called for by any applicable
governmental regulation weighs against a finding of an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law.
USSG § 8A1.2. Comment 3(k)
60. Alan R. Yuspeh, Developing a Corporate Compliance Program, Legal Back-
grounder 1, 2 (Wash Legal Found, March 29, 1991).
61. Yuspeh, Legal Backgrounder at 2 (cited in note 60).
62. The Washington Legal Foundation is a 501(C)(3) tax exempt organization and is
American's largest pro-free enterprise public interest law and policy center. Id at 1. The
Legal Backgrounder is a series of original papers written and published by the Foundation's
Legal Studies Division. Id. The Legal Studies Division of the Foundation is dedicated to
expanding the pro-free enterprise legal idea base. It does this by conducting original re-
search and writing and delivering a diverse array of publications to businessmen, academics
and government officials. Id at 4.
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gram. These steps include: (1) the identification of risk areas;63 (2)
the development of a code of conduct;64 (3) the development of a
system for the distribution of the code of conduct throughout the
corporation;6 5 (4) the development of a training and orientation
program;66 (5) the institution of a hotline or osbudman;6 7 (6) com-
munication with employees;' (7) coordination with internal audit
capabilities;69 (8) assignment of responsibilities thoughtfully within
the corporation;70 (9) incorporation of compliance concerns with
performance reviews;71 and (10) emphasizing the key role of senior
management.72
ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES UNDER THE GUIDELINES
If a corporation has in place a program to detect and prevent
criminal activity, the presence of this program may carry benefits
in addition to merely mitigating the fine at the time of criminal
sentencing. A well-planned compliance program may eliminate the
conduct which creates the criminal violation in the first place.7 3
63. Id at 2. For a program to make any sense, the program must be structured to
address the particular areas of potential wrongdoing within the corporation. It is useless for
a securities firm to have an environmental policy for instance. Similarly, the larger and more
complex a corporation, the more formal and extensive a program must be.
64. Id. The corporation must develop some statement as to the conduct it expects
from its employees. Id.
65. Id. Generally, the program should be in writing and some formal distribution sys-
tem should be in place to make employees aware of the expected standards. Id.
66. Id. The training and orientation programs should be tailored to the specific needs
of a particular corporation. Id.
67. Id at 3. A hotline or osbudman is certainly critical in this area. A corporation will
need to ensure that its employees can "whistle blow" on a corporation without the fear of
retaliation. Due to the confidentiality concerns of the individual employee, a separate office
would probably best handle such a task.
68. Id. Some sort of continuing education program should be implemented. Id.
69. Id. The Washington Legal Foundation suggests that this is an important aspect
of any compliance program:
Historically, many of these departments have not reported at a sufficiently high level
in an organization nor have they been adequately staffed to be effective. A part of any
compliance program should be a review of the resources and activities of the internal
audit function to make certain they are adequate.
Id.
70. Id. Large corporations will likely need separate officers or even departments to
administer a compliance program. Id. Smaller organizations should be able to implement a
compliance program merely by assigning additional tasks to existing employees. Id.
71. Id. Compliance is more likely if an appraisal is part of the employee's review. Id.
72. Id. For any program to succeed, senior managers of the organization must be
committed to the program. Id.
73. Nancy A. Nord, "Sentencing Guidelines Up the Ante for Corporate Compliance
Programs," American Corporate Counsel Association Docket 53 (Fall 1991).
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Additionally, if a compliance program is in place before the com-
mission of the alleged crime, the presence of the compliance pro-
gram may be used to convince a prosecutor "to forego issuing an
indictment."
7 4
Although the guidelines add a new weapon to the arsenal of the
prosecutor when sentencing a corporation, the prosecutor must
still prove beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary elements of
any alleged crime during a trial. Prior to the promulgation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, three circuit courts of appeal addressed the
issue of whether a corporate compliance program can be consid-
ered when determining whether the corporation is guilty of the
offense. 5
In the case of United States v Basic Const. Co., 76 the Fourth
Circuit held that a corporation's antitrust compliance policy was
relevant in determining whether the employees were indeed acting
for the benefit of the corporation. The court said:
[A] corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations
committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation,
even if... such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions.7 8
The court went on to explain that the existence of a compliance
program may be admitted into evidence:
In the instant case, the district court properly allowed the jury to consider
Basic's alleged antitrust compliance policy in determining whether the em-
ployees were acting for the benefit of the corporation. It also properly in-
structed [the jury] on the issue of intent in an antitrust prosecution, i.e.,
that corporate intent is shown by the actions and statements of the officers,
directors, and employees who are in positions of authority or have apparent
74. Nord, American Corporate Counsel Association Docket at 53 (cited in note 73).
75. In these Circuits, the Second, Fourth and Ninth, the courts have addressed the
issue of the use of the compliance program once the trial of the corporation has commenced.
See notes 76-84 and accompanying text. Even if a compliance program is not introduced
into evidence, the program may still be used to persuade a prosecutor not to file an indict-
ment in the first place. Nord, American Corporate Counsel Association Docket at 53 (cited
in note 73). It should be noted that because of the mandatory nature of the new guidelines,
the guidelines will be used to sentence the corporation regardless of any other benefit which
may accrue to a corporation having a program in place under the guidelines.
76. 711 F2d 571 (4th Cir 1983). The defendants in this case were charged with con-
spiring to rig the bidding of state road paving contracts in violation of the Sherman Act.
Basic, 711 F2d at 572. The defendant corporation argued that in a criminal antitrust prose-
cution, intent must be proven and cannot be presumed. Id. The defendant also argued that
the intent of the corporation had to be proven separately from that of any employee on
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authority to make policy for the corporation.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also permitted a jury to
consider the presence of a compliance program when determining
the liability of a corporation. 0 In the case of United States v
Beusch,1 the defendant corporation appealed a misdemeanor con-
viction on the basis that a jury instruction which stated that the
corporation may be liable for the acts of its agents was improper.82
The court said that such an instruction does not impose strict lia-
bility on the corporation:
Rather, it suggests that a corporation may be liable for acts of its employ-
ees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but that the existence
of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether
the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation. Merely stating or
publishing such instructions and policies without diligently enforcing them
is not enough to place the acts of an employee who violates them outside
the scope of his employment.
8 3
Finally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar
issue but reached a different result in United States v Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp."4 Here, the defendants were charged'with
violating a consent decree.8 5 The corporation tried to defend the
action by demonstrating that the corporation's compliance pro-
gram prohibited its employees from engaging in such practices.
8 6
79. Id. The trial court admitted evidence of the compliance policy to show whether
the employee was acting for the benefit of the corporation at the time of committing the
offense. Id at 572. Basic argued that the evidence should have been used to show whether
the company had the "requisite intent" to commit the crime. Id. The court limited the use
of the evidence for the former purpose. Id at 573.
80. United States v Beusch, 596 F2d 871 (9th Cir 1979).
81. 596 F2d 871 (9th Cir 1979). The defendants, a corporate foreign currency ex-
change dealer and the responsible corporate officer, were convicted of misdemeanor viola-
tions of the Bank Secrecy Act. Beusch, 596 F2d at 873.
82. Id at 877. The particular jury instruction in question read: "A corporation may be
responsible for the acts of its agents done or made within the scope of its authority, even
though the agent's conduct may be contrary to the corporation's actual instruction or con-
trary to the corporation's stated policies." Id.
83. Id at 878. The court stated that it is a question of fact as to whether measures
taken to enforce corporate policy in an area will adequately insulate the corporation from
liability. Id.
84. 882 F2d 656 (2d Cir 1989), cert denied, 493 US 1021 (1990). The film studio and
one of its employees were held in contempt for violating provisions of an antitrust consent
decree. Fox, 882 F2d at 657. As a result of a consent decree dating from the 1950's, film
studios are prohibited from "block booking" films. Id. A studio block-books a film when the
studio conditions the release of a choice first run film upon the licensing of other films
usually far less popular. Id.
85. Id at 658.
86. Id at 660. Fox argued that even if its branch manager violated the consent decree,
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However, the court would not accept the argument:
We agree with the district court that Fox's compliance program, however,
extensive, does not immunize the corporation from liability when its em-
ployees, acting within the scope of their authority, fail to comply with the
law and the consent decree. It is settled law that a corporation may be held
criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees
or agents acting within the scope of their authority.
8 7
In this opinion, the Second Circuit cited what would appear to
be the contradictory authority of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Basic Const. Co. It appears, however, that all three of the above
cases can be reconciled by analyzing the prohibitions of the courts.
The Second Circuit in Twentieth Century Fox stated that no mat-
ter how extensive a compliance program, its presence will not re-
lieve the corporation of liability."" The Fourth and the Ninth Cir-
cuits stated that a compliance program may be used to show that
the employee was not acting as an agent of the corporation per-
forming activities for the benefit of the corporation at the time the
criminal activity was committed. 9 In the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
cuits, the mere presence of a compliance program does not necessa-
rily relieve the corporation from liability. Rather these circuits
used evidence of the compliance programs to show that the em-
ployee was not acting as an agent of the corporation at the time
the offense was committed.90 Presumably, it could be argued that a
corporation in the Second Circuit will also be relieved from liabil-
ity if it can show that the criminal act was outside the agent's au-
thority and the act was not performed for the benefit of the
corporation.91
It should be noted that the issue of whether a court will admit
evidence of a compliance program into the record to determine the
criminal culpability of a corporation, must not be confused with
the use of the compliance program as a mitigation factor during
the violation was not willful in view of the extensive program Fox adopted to encourage its
employees to comply with the decree. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Basic, 711 F2d at 573; Beusch, 596 F2d at 878.
90. See note 87 and accompanying text.
91. When convicting a corporation of criminal fault, it is generally necessary to show
that the crime was committed by an agent of the corporation acting within the agent's au-
thority. Basic, 711 F2d at 573. The Second Circuit states that no matter how extensive a
compliance program, the corporation cannot be relieved of liability. Twentieth Century Fox,
882 F2d at 660. However, if the agent was not acting as an agent of the corporation, a nexus
is lacking between the person committing the criminal act and the corporation.
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sentencing. Under the sentencing guidelines, consideration of a
compliance program is mandatory.92 However, the two issues are
closely related. If a corporation has an effective compliance pro-
gram in place, chances are much better that the corporation is not
liable for the offense. If the corporation has taken all reasonable
steps to detect and prevent criminal conduct, it is easier for the
corporation to show that the person who committed the offense
was acting outside the scope of corporate authority.
DESIREABILITY AND POTENTIAL INADEQUACY
Under the new sentencing guidelines, a corporation may face
fines and penalties reaching into the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars.93 Additionally, the implementation of a compliance program
will create added expenses for a corporation. Therefore, the busi-
ness community will not welcome the new guidelines if for no other
reason than the fact that the guidelines will increase the cost of
doing business. 94 Although the business community would have
preferred non-binding guidelines, the guidelines could have been
more stringent.95 At least under the current guidelines, a corpora-
tion can avoid a great amount of any fine by following the mitigat-
ing steps set forth in the guidelines.96 Therefore, it is possible for a
corporation to live in harmony with the new guidelines.
One is to question, however, whether the guidelines are generally
desirable. In answering this question, I make a general assumption
that a modern corporation must show responsibility for its actions.
Additionally, it is necessary to look to the mission of the Sentenc-
ing Commission and the purposes behind the guidelines.
The statutory mission of the Sentencing Commission, as set
forth under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, was to
enact guidelines which assisted in furthering "the basic purposes of
92. USSG § 8A1.1 The guidelines state: "This chapter applies to the sentencing of all
organizations for felony and Class A misdemeanor offenses." Id.
93. USSG §§ 8B1.1 and 8C1.1 et seq. For discussion of these provisions, see notes 21-
34 and accompanying text.
94. Giuffra, Legal Backgrounder at 4 (cited in note 6).
95. Id. Both the Department of Justice and certain special interest groups have
voiced an opinion that the guidelines are too generous. Id.
96. USSG § 8C2.5. The guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 1991, have
alleviated one major concern with earlier drafts: ".... the [Sentencing] Commission's empha-
sis in setting fine levels based on the level of involvement of management in the offense
makes it less likely that a single misadventure by an unauthorized low-level employee could




criminal punishment, i.e., deterring crime, incapacitating the of-
fender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the of-
fender. 97 Additionally, the policy statement issued along with the
enactment of guidelines for the sentencing of individuals states
that the basic objective of those guidelines was "to enhance the
ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime through an
effective, sentencing system." 98 Congress sought to achieve this ob-
jective through "honesty, uniformity and proportionality in the
sentencing system.""9
Since the new guidelines will merely complete another chapter of
a complete system of criminal sentencing, it is interesting to com-
pare the new guidelines in light of this previously stated purpose.
The Introductory Comment t6 the new guidelines states:
This chapter is designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations
and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate de-
terrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms
for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct. 100
The guidelines attempt to achieve these goals through the princi-
ples set forth at the beginning of this comment. 1 1
The penalties imposed under the guidelines have been set at a
level significantly high to reach the attention of corporate execu-
tives. Whereas the penalties imposed before the implementation of
the guidelines were trivial by comparison, suddenly, a significant
portion of a corporation's assets may be threatened by a criminal
offense. The significant penalties imposed will force a corporation
to become responsible for its actions. Previously, the cost of any
penalty would likely be dismissed as the mere cost of doing busi-
ness. Thus, the guidelines as structured will serve their intended
97. 18 USC Appendix Ch 1, 2.
98. 18 USC Appendix Ch 1, 3.
99. Id. In explaining these objectives, the policy statement states:
Congress first sought honesty in sentencing. It sought to avoid the confusion and im-
plict deception that arises out of the present sentencing system which requires a
judge to impose an indeterminate sentence that is automatically reduced in most
cases by 'good time' credits. In addition, the parole commission is permitted to deter-
mine how much of the remainder of any prison sentence an offender actually will
serve . . . Second, Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed by differed Federal courts for similar criminal conduct
by similar offenders. Third, Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differ-
ent severity.
Id.
100. USSG § Introductory Comment.
101. See note 7.
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purpose. In this light, the new guidelines are very desirable.
One publication has suggested, however, that the sentencing
guidelines will clearly conflict with traditional white-collar defense
techniques and will cause changes in corporate behavior to increase
compliance. 102 The sentencing guidelines require a radical depar-
ture in the way that an attorney will present a corporate defense.
When conducting the traditional defense of a corporation, coun-
sel for the corporation focused first on whether the potential viola-
tions should be disclosed at all.10 3 Similarly, if the government was
already conducting an investigation, counsel usually attempted to
persuade the government that the corporation should not be
charged. 104 Because fines in the past were minimal compared to
those set forth under the sentencing guidelines, a corporation often
entered a guilty plea to the offense and no prosecution of the indi-
viduals involved in the offense occurred. 105 Ambiguity, coupled
with "the absence of adequate decisional guidelines in a discretion-
ary system of judicial sentencing, [gave] defense attorneys a cen-
tral role in determining the type and length of sentence in white-
collar cases."'0 6
The traditional techniques, however, may prove detrimental
under the sentencing guidelines:
Under the Guidelines, the traditional strategies may be harmful or even
impossible. The factors involved in calculating the culpability score place a
premium on cooperation with the government and therefore may put the
organization at odds with the interests of its employees.'"7 Similarly, advo-
cacy at sentencing, is of less utility because judges will have much less
102. Thomas E. Holliday, John H. Sturc and Brian E. Casey, "Corporate Criminal
Liability; Tilting the Balance: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on Organizational
Defendants," Insights 2 Prentice Hall Law & Business (August 8, 1991).
103. Holliday, Sturc and Casey, Insights at 6 (cited in note 102).
104. Id. Counsel was inclined to present the facts in a light most favorable to the
corporation. Id.
105. Id. Under the traditional defense, if a guilty plea was entered, the plea was often
followed by a "second period of intensive advocacy-at the time of sentencing." Id.
106. Id, citing Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime at 13 (Yale Univ.
Press 1985). When sentencing a corporation, the court would weigh "the nature of the of-
fense, . . . the role of the defendant in the offense, . . . the defendant's background" and
"the appropriateness of the sentence." Holiday, Sturc and Casey, Insights at 6 (cited in
note 102).
107. One must question how cooperative an individual will be with a government
investigation when the investigation may disclose facts which also convict the individual.
Thus, a possible Fifth Amendment self-incrimination challenge may exist for those individ-
uals charged under the sentencing guidelines. However, the guidelines do not require that
an individual testify against his own interest, but this failure to testify may be viewed as a





Thus, the guidelines require that if a potential offense occurs,
counsel should quickly investigate the facts before they come to
the attention of the government so that the entity may make an
intelligent decision regarding the nature of the possible offense.10 9
Corporate counsel must take all actions which will reduce the miti-
gation score.110 It has been suggested that if counsel can determine
that "substantial authority personnel" were not involved in the of-
fense, then the sentencing guidelines strongly point toward volun-
tary disclosure of the problem to authorities."' Conversely, corpo-
rations that impede the investigation or prosecution of an offense
will be penalized through the implementation of a higher culpabil-
ity score.112 Of special concern, the guidelines may also penalize
entities which remain loyal to high-level employees, thus, conflict
problems may emerge at an early stage in an investigation.1 '
Commentators have also suggested that the adversarial role of
counsel will change:
Second, much of counsel's focus will shift from an adversarial role to shap-
ing the charging decision. In view of the constraints on the exercise of judi-
cial discretion, efforts to reduce the base offense level through negotiations
with the government over the nature of the offenses charged and their al-
leged economic effect are crucial to the determination of the base fine and
the starting point for any sentence. Because many regulatory matters...
may be resolved on either a civil or criminal basis, these decisions must be
made even when no criminal investigation has begun. Thus, the Guidelines
further encourage efforts towards a regulatory resolution.1 "
Finally, factual litigation will become of increased significance.
Since factual differences can lead to a change in the applicability
of the culpability factors, a fear has been expressed that sentencing
hearings may become mini-trials concerning the quality of the or-
ganization's conduct and the scope of the economic effect of the
crime.1 5 "Since the sentences will be based upon judicial findings
that may be subject to appeal, sentencing hearings will be more
108. Holliday, Sturc and Casey, Insights at 6 (cited in note 102).
109. Id. Early investigation will enable the corporation to self-report the offense thus
enabling the corporation to achieve a more favorable culpability score. USSG § 8C2.5.








extended and complex. 1 16
Counsel representing a corporation may be placed in a difficult
situation. The attorney is ethically obligated to provide the best
defense possible for a corporation charged with criminal conduct.
If at all possible, the attorney should attempt to have the indict-
ment discharged without prosecution. Under the new guidelines,
however, such a strategy creates a conflict of interest because the
corporation runs the possibility of adding to the culpability score
for lack of cooperation.
Similarly, culpability scoring is affected if the corporation self-
reported the offense. Thus, the potential exists that a corporation
which self-reports the offense and one convicted after a trial will
be sentenced to different penalties. This possibility raises issues
under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury.
There are other miscellaneous concerns regarding the guidelines.
For instance, due to the elaborate restitution provisions available
under the guidelines, one is to question whether other tort reme-
dies may not have been better suited for such purposes. Addition-
ally, since the imposition of the fines imposed under the guidelines
are mandatory, it is uncertain if the plea bargaining system upon
which our criminal system so strongly depends will be affected.
Therefore, from the standpoint of the defense attorney, the guide-
lines present a number of potential inadequacies.
CONCLUSION
More than any recent statute, the sentencing guidelines may
profoundly affect corporate behavior. The sentencing guidelines
became effective on November 1, 1991. At this point, it is difficult
to tell exactly how vigorously courts will use the guidelines in sen-
tencing corporations guilty of crimes. It should be noted that even
though imposition of the guidelines is mandatory, the sentencing
court maintains some discretion as to the sentence imposed. The
guidelines merely present a range of fines.
It remains to be seen whether the guidelines themselves will
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Sentencing Commission
passed guidelines recently for the sentencing of individuals.
117
These guidelines were challenged in Mistretta v United States.' 8
Here the United States Supreme Court upheld the placing of the
116. Id.
117. 18 USC Appx Ch. 1 et seq. (1987).
118. 488 US 361, 109 S Ct 647 (1989).
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Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch of govern-
ment.119 However, in Mistretta, the Court left open the possibility
that a challenge could be based upon a separation of powers argu-
ment.120 The Sentencing Commission consists of seven voting
members and one non-voting member. The voting members are
members of the judiciary. Interestingly, the non-voting member is
a member of the Attorney General's office, a department of the
executive branch. Whether the influence presented by the non-vot-
ing member is sufficient to hold the sentencing guidelines uncon-
stitutional remains to be seen.
The deterrent effect of the guidelines will serve a valuable pur-
pose in preventing corporate misconduct. However, a number of
questions remain unanswered about the new guidelines. For in-
stance, to what extent must counsel defending a corporation revise
defense strategies. Additionally, it remains to be seen if certain in-
dividual provisions of the guidelines will withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
It is unmistakable, however, that courts and prosecutors have in
their possession a powerful new weapon to combat corporate crime.
In today's trying economic times, corporate executives will inevita-
bly worry about an overly aggressive prosecutor who presses for
the glamourous sentence. If the guidelines are applied indiscrimi-
nately, the possibility exists for financial losses as never before
seen. One can only hope that judges and prosecutors use restraint
until the effectiveness of the new weapon is tested.
Eric J. Zagrocki
119. Minstretta, 109 S Ct at 667.
120. Paul D. Kamenas, New Corporate Sentencing Guidelines May Be Unconstitu-
tional and Should Be Challenged, Legal Op Letter 1, 2 (Wash Legal Found, Oct 25, 1991).
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